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INTRODUCTION
1

The venerable doctrine of collateral estoppel is currently in a
2
state of flux. The ever-increasing expense of operating the judicial
3
system urges expanded use of the doctrine, while due process
4
concerns remain a limiting factor. The recent Minnesota Supreme
5
Court case of Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Reed dealt with two
different aspects of collateral estoppel: who may be considered to
be in privity with a criminal defendant and whether a criminal
6
conviction will generally be given estoppel effect. Reed held that a
criminal conviction cannot be used by an insurance company to
collaterally estop a civil plaintiff from proving that the criminal
7
defendant’s act was unintentional. Thus, the civil plaintiff is
allowed to prove the convicted criminal defendant’s lack of intent,
and thereby escape the intentional-act exclusion in the defendant’s
8
insurance policy.
This Note first examines the goals and history of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel, including the great changes the doctrine has
9
undergone of late. It then examines the facts of the Reed case,
details the procedural history of the case, and outlines the analysis
10
of the courts in deciding the case. This Note then analyzes both
the successes and the failures of the Minnesota Supreme Court in
11
the Reed opinion.
Finally, this Note concludes that the Reed
decision is correct in its privity and due process analyses, but falls
1. Collateral estoppel is defined as “[t]he binding effect of a judgment as to
matters actually litigated and determined in one action on later controversies
between the parties involving a different claim from that on which the original
judgment was based.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (8th ed. 2004).
2. See generally Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002), rev’d, 662 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 2003) (discussing the widening scope of the
use of criminal convictions for collateral estoppel).
3. The February 2004 Minnesota budget forecast estimates that the state trial
courts will cost $371,920,000 to run in 2004. Minn. Dep’t of Fin., February 2004
General Fund Statement-Detail 15 (Feb. 27, 2004), at http://www.budget.state.mn.us/
budget/summary/index.shtml.
4. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (“It is a
violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who . . . has
never had an opportunity to be heard.”).
5. 662 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 2003).
6. Id. at 533-34.
7. Id. at 534.
8. See id.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
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short by failing to clarify what collateral estoppel effect a criminal
12
conviction has in general.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Collateral Estoppel and Related Doctrines
The doctrine of collateral estoppel has long been a part of
13
both English and United States common law. Courts in the U.S.
14
recognized this doctrine at least as early as 1876. During the late
twentieth century, the doctrine of collateral estoppel has seen
15
major changes.
Generally, these changes have increased the
16
scope of situations in which collateral estoppel can be applied.
Collateral estoppel, as with the related doctrines of res
17
18
19
judicata, law of the case, and stare decisis, has as its goal the
20
These
promotion of stability, predictability, and consistency.
12. See infra Part V.
13. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
14. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1877) (differentiating between
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel).
15. RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 1116
(3d ed. 2000).
16. Id. Today, Minnesota courts allow the use of collateral estoppel when
four conditions are met: (1) the issue to be collaterally estopped is identical to one
previously adjudicated, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party
to be estopped was a party or is in privity with a party in the prior adjudication,
and (4) the estopped party had opportunity to be heard. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v.
Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 531-32 (Minn. 2003).
17. Literally, “a thing adjudicated,” “res judicata” refers to “[a]n affirmative
defense barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same
claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of
transactions and that could have been – but was not – raised in the first suit.”
BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 1336-37.
18. Law of the case refers to “[t]he doctrine holding that a decision rendered
in a former appeal of a case is binding in a later appeal.” Id. at 903.
19. Literally “to stand by things decided,” stare decisis is “[t]he doctrine of
precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.” Id. at 1443.
20. See ROGER C. PARK & DOUGLAS D. MCFARLAND, COMPUTER-AIDED EXERCISES
ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 214-15 (4th ed. 1995). In addition, res judicata and collateral
estoppel are both based on several policies protecting both public and private
interests. Id. By preventing re-litigation of claims and issues, these doctrines
protect the prevailing party’s interest in the judgment, and at the same time
prevent the additional emotional and financial burden of litigation. Id. at 215. In
the public sphere, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are
necessary to prevent a court’s judgment from becoming a mere “empty gesture.”
Id. They also promote judicial efficiency and open up the courts to those with new
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doctrines differ, however, in how they seek to promote these goals.
Collateral estoppel seeks to prevent parties and their privities from
re-litigating an issue that has already been actually litigated and
that was necessary to the prior judgment, though the prior claim
21
was different. Res judicata, as opposed to the narrower collateral
estoppel, is a “broad sword that has more capability to prevent
22
litigation.” It prevents parties and their privities from re-litigating
an entire claim, including all issues within that claim that were or
23
should have been litigated in the prior suit.
Law of the case,
unlike both res judicata and collateral estoppel, works within a
24
single case rather than in two cases. It provides that appellate
court decisions are binding on lower courts, as well as on the
appellate courts themselves, by self-restraint, if the case returns on
25
another appeal. Finally, stare decisis applies to different parties
26
than those in the original litigation. It uses results from one case
27
to aid in determining the outcome of another case. Stare decisis
28
is persuasive rather than binding like the other doctrines.
The terminology used to refer to the doctrines of res judicata
29
and collateral estoppel is far from uniform in the law. Therefore,
a note about vocabulary is in order. The term “res judicata” may
refer to preclusion of issues as well as to preclusion of entire
30
claims.
Other times “res judicata” refers only to preclusion of
31
Thus, “res judicata” can be synonymous with “claim
claims.
claims and issues to litigate. Id. Finally, these doctrines are concerned with
preserving the integrity of the judicial system by preventing inconsistent results
from case to case. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2002), rev’d, 662 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 2003). These benefits do come at a cost,
however. The primary cost of these policy considerations is that the claims and
issues are precluded regardless of their merits. PARK & MCFARLAND, supra, at 215.
Thus, these doctrines reflect the policy that “sometimes it is more important that a
judgment be stable than that it be correct.” FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 14.3 at 619 (2d ed. 1993).
21. PARK & MCFARLAND, supra note 20, at 214.
22. Ryan R. Dreyer, Case Note, Discouraging Declaratory Actions in Minnesota:
The Res Judicata Effect of Declaratory Judgments in Light of State v. Joseph, 29 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 613, 618 (2002).
23. PARK & MCFARLAND, supra note 20, at 214.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 215.
29. Id. at 213.
30. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 1114.
31. Dreyer, supra note 22, at 618-19. The fact that the term “merger and bar”
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preclusion,” and “collateral estoppel” can be synonymous with
32
“issue preclusion.” As used in this note, “res judicata” will refer
only to preclusion of entire claims, and “collateral estoppel” will
refer to preclusion of issues.
B. Changes in Collateral Estoppel Law
1.

The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Criminal Judgments Generally

Traditionally, courts have not afforded criminal judgments the
33
same collateral estoppel effect as civil judgments.
Indeed, the
historical practice was to give criminal judgments no collateral
34
estoppel effect whatsoever. But in the last thirty years, courts have
been increasingly willing to use prior criminal convictions to
35
collaterally estop issues in subsequent civil litigation. This shift
was caused by the erosion of several historical objections to this
36
type of collateral estoppel.
In addition, several other factors
weigh strongly in favor of granting criminal convictions general
37
collateral estoppel effect.
a. Historical Objections to Giving Criminal Judgments
Collateral Estoppel Effect
One traditional objection to the use of criminal convictions for
collateral estoppel purposes was the now-defunct evidentiary rule
38
that an interested person could not testify in a civil case.
Therefore, if the victim of a crime testified in the criminal trial, and
the perpetrator of the crime was convicted, then that conviction

is often used interchangeably with “res judicata” or “claim preclusion” further
complicates the issue. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 1114-15.
32. “Courts tend to use res judicata and collateral estoppel, while the
Restatement and some academics use claim and issue preclusion, respectively.”
Dreyer, supra note 22, at 617 n.31.
33. See generally Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2002).
34. Id.
35. See generally Beth Boggs & Dan McLaughlin, Criminal Convictions Do Not
Equal Intentional Acts: A Review of Illinois Law on the Collateral Effects of Criminal
Convictions in Civil Proceedings, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 281 (2001) (surveying various
jurisdictions’ treatment of the use of collateral estoppel in civil proceedings based
on prior criminal convictions).
36. See Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 560-63.
37. Id. at 562.
38. Id. at 560.
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39

could not be used in a subsequent civil trial brought by the victim.
If it were used, the victim would essentially be testifying in the civil
trial because his testimony contributed to the prior conviction, and
40
the conviction would be used in the civil trial.
Though this
41
evidentiary rule has not been in effect for some 150 years, the rule
against using criminal convictions for collateral estoppel purposes
42
continued long thereafter.
Historically, the courts have also objected to the use of
criminal convictions for collateral estoppel purposes because of the
43
mutuality requirement. Early courts considering the doctrine of
collateral estoppel insisted that the parties in the first suit be
44
identical to those in the second suit. This requirement was based
on principles of fairness: it would be unfair to allow a party to use
collateral estoppel against his opponent if he himself would not
have been bound by the judgment had the judgment come out
45
differently.
A criminal defendant cannot use the fact of his
acquittal in a later civil action “because an acquittal is a finding that
the fact was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt and the civil
burden of proof requires only a fair preponderance of the
46
evidence.”
Therefore, mutuality dictated that a criminal
defendant that is convicted cannot be estopped in a subsequent
civil trial. Thus, the mutuality requirement served to prevent
47
criminal convictions from being granted collateral estoppel effect.
The courts and the legal community frequently criticized the
48
mutuality requirement. On the strength of this criticism, the U.S.
49
Supreme Court abandoned the requirement of mutuality in 1971.
39. See id. at 560-61.
40. See id.
41. This evidentiary rule was done away with by the Evidentiary Act of 1843.
Id. at 560.
42. Id. at 560-61.
43. Id. at 561.
44. See generally E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Comment Note – Mutuality of
Estoppel as Prerequisite of Availability of Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to a Stranger to the
Judgment, 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 (1970).
45. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979).
46. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 561.
47. Id.
48. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 327; see also Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat.
Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942) (“No satisfactory rationalization
has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not
bound by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res judicata
against a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend.”).
49. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court abandoned the mutuality
50
requirement, at least for a limited class of cases, as early as 1955.
51
Today, the mutuality requirement is effectively a dead letter. Of
course, though courts no longer require mutuality, due process
mandates that the party to be bound by the prior judgment must
52
have been a party (or in privity with a party) in the prior action.
Thus, at the time Reed was decided, the mutuality requirement had
already been abandoned in Minnesota, as it had been in almost
53
every other jurisdiction.
A third objection to using criminal convictions for collateral
estoppel purposes was the notion that a criminal verdict was
nothing more than the opinion of the jurors, and was therefore
54
55
hearsay. This objection is invalid for two reasons. First, whether
or not evidence is hearsay is germane to its admissibility, rather
56
than to its collateral estoppel effect. Second, if this objection was
heeded, no judgment could be given collateral estoppel effect
because all judgments are simply the opinion of another court or
57
jury.
A final historical objection to giving criminal convictions
58
collateral estoppel effect is simple obedience to stare decisis.
Some courts continued to deny criminal convictions collateral
59
estoppel effect simply because precedent called for it.
This is
likely the reason that this rule continued for so long after the
50. Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364 (1955).
51. B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y. 1967). See generally
Schopler, supra note 44. With the abandonment of the mutuality requirement,
most courts have accepted the use of both defensive and offensive non-mutual
collateral estoppel. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 563. Defensive collateral estoppel would
apply, for example, if “A sues B for patent infringement. Following full litigation,
the court adjudges the patent invalid. A then sues C for infringement of the same
patent. C pleads collateral estoppel against A on the issue of the validity of the
patent. C is using collateral estoppel defensively . . . .” PARK & MCFARLAND, supra
note 20, at 222. Offensive collateral estoppel, on the other hand, might occur
where A, B, and C all live on property abutting a lake. A sues X for dumping
toxins in the lake; A is successful. Then B and C sue X for the same incident, and
assert collateral estoppel to prevent X from re-litigating the dumping. See id. at
222-23.
52. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 327.
53. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 561, 565.
54. Id. at 563.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 179 N.E. 711, 712 (N.Y. 1932).
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original reasons for it were no longer viable. Of course, once a
legal rule becomes anachronistic and unnecessary, stare decisis
should not dictate the continued practice of that rule. Thus, by the
time of the Reed decision, the historical reasons that criminal
convictions could not be used for collateral estoppel had all ceased
60
to be present in the law.
b. Additional Arguments in Favor of Giving Criminal
Judgments Collateral Estoppel Effect
The historical objections to using criminal convictions for
61
In addition, a
collateral estoppel are no longer defensible.
number of other factors have convinced many courts to abandon
the traditional rule and liberalize collateral estoppel law to include
62
criminal convictions. These factors are generally of a procedural
63
nature, and chief among these is the higher burden of proof in
64
criminal trials over that in civil trials.
Because criminal
convictions require proof beyond a reasonable doubt rather than
merely a fair preponderance of the evidence, courts can be more
assured that estopping a civil litigant based on an issue in a
65
criminal conviction is proper. Other procedural safeguards that
are unique to criminal trials include “the requirement[] of . . . a
unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record paid for by
66
the state on appeal.”
Thus, “[s]tability of judgments and
expeditious trials are served and no injustice done, when criminal
defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in
67
conformity with these safeguards.” These procedural factors, the
interest in promoting judicial economy, and the waning of the
historical objections enumerated above all combine to convince
many courts that using criminal convictions for collateral estoppel
68
purposes is to be encouraged.

60. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 560-63.
61. See id. at 560-63; supra notes 38-60 and accompanying text.
62. See Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 375 P.2d 439, 441 (Cal.
1962) (stating that it is more fair to estop a civil litigant based on a prior criminal
conviction than it is to estop him based on a prior civil judgment because of the
increased safeguards present in criminal trials); Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 562.
63. See Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 562.
64. See id.
65. Teitelbaum Furs, 375 P.2d at 441.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Teitelbaum Furs, 375 P.2d at 441; Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 560-63.
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On the strength of these factors, the traditional rule has been
eroded to the degree that it is now the exception, rather than the
69
rule. The erosion of the traditional rule began in a landmark
70
Virginia Supreme Court case in 1927. This case, Eagle, Star, &
British Dominions Insurance Co. v. Heller, held that a criminal
conviction can be given collateral estoppel effect, but only when
the convicted party later attempts to profit from his crime in a civil
71
suit. This exception to the traditional rule is now widely accepted,
72
including in Minnesota. Indeed, this exception paved the way for
the practice of giving criminal convictions collateral estoppel effect
even when the convicted criminal does not seek to profit from his
73
crime, an approach now followed by a majority of jurisdictions
74
and by the Restatement. Thus, before Reed, Minnesota recognized
75
the “profit-from-the-crime” exception, but had not recognized the
76
general collateral estoppel effect of a criminal conviction.

69. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 561.
70. Eagle, Star, & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 140 S.E. 314 (Va.
1927).
71. Id at 321. Max Heller was convicted of burning a stock of goods with the
intent to injure the insurer of the goods. He then collected the proceeds of the
insurance policy on the goods. The court went against the traditional rule and
gave the criminal conviction collateral estoppel effect. Id.
72. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289
(1968). See also Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 721 F.2d 506, 508-09 (5th Cir.
1983) (discussing Texas’ use of criminal convictions for collateral estoppel
purposes); United States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145, 160 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussing
collateral estoppel in both criminal and civil contexts); Breeland v. Sec. Ins. Co. of
New Haven, Conn., 421 F.2d 918, 922 (5th Cir. 1969) (“[t]he number of
jurisdictions holding that a criminal conviction precludes litigation of the same
issue in a civil suit is ever increasing”); May v. Oldfield, 698 F. Supp. 124, 126 (E.D.
Ky. 1988) (noting recent cases allowing this type of collateral estoppel use); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Niziolek, 481 N.E.2d 1356, 1359 (Mass. 1985) (overturning the
traditional rule in Massachusetts); Hopps v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 506 A.2d 294, 297
(N.H. 1985) (“there is a stronger rationale for applying collateral estoppel against
a former criminal defendant than for applying it against a party to a prior civil
case, since the criminal defendant has had the benefit of the presumption of
innocence and the State’s obligation to prove any fact essential to the conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt”); Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Cannon, 615 P.2d 1316,
1319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (noting the procedural safeguards present in criminal
trials and adopting the exception).
73. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 561.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 (1982).
75. See Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 558-59, 163 N.W.2d 289, 296.
76. See Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 568.
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2. The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Criminal Judgments: Reed’s
Privity Problem
It is clear that the trend in collateral estoppel law is to give
criminal convictions collateral estoppel effect on the same basis as
77
any other judgment. What is less clear, however, is how courts
deal with the other problem in Reed: namely, whether or not a civil
plaintiff that is the victim of a crime is in privity with the convicted
perpetrator of that crime for collateral estoppel purposes. It is
illustrative to consider some of the reasons courts have cited for
either finding privity or not finding privity in such cases.
a.

Courts Finding Privity

Not all courts have faced the privity question presented by
Reed. It appears, however, that of those jurisdictions that have
considered the issue, the majority have concluded that for
insurance purposes, there is privity between a criminal defendant
and the plaintiff that seeks to recover from the defendant in a
78
subsequent civil trial. Courts that so hold focus primarily on the
fact that the civil plaintiff’s right to the insurance proceeds derives
79
from the same right of the insured criminal. These courts also
80
emphasize that if the state had a direct-action statute, the
77. Id. at 560; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
78. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374, 385 (5th Cir. 1997);
see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 596 A.2d 414, 421, 425 (Conn. 1991)
(holding that privity is established when “the victim of an insured defendant
derives her rights to collect insurance proceeds directly from the rights of the
insured defendant”); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Yon, 796 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1990) (“[T]he wrongful-death claimants’ rights are only as good as the rights
that [the convicted insured] can assert against Safeco under the insurance
contract”); State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d 35, 38 (Me. 1991) (finding privity
in such circumstances, at least for murder, attempted murder, and sexual abuse of
a child convictions); Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 673 P.2d 1277, 1280-81
(Mont. 1984) (finding that a criminal conviction has preclusive effects against a
third party where the rights of the third party derived from those of the convict);
New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 391 A.2d 923, 926 (N.J Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978) (stating that because the victim “stood in the shoes” of the insured, there
was privity); In re Nassau Ins. Co., 577 N.E.2d 1039, 1040 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that
a conviction for manslaughter collaterally estopped the executor of the victim
from claiming insurance proceeds under the theory that the killer did not act
intentionally); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Reuter, 700 P.2d 236, 241 (Or. 1985)
(finding privity between a sexual assault victim and the perpetrator of the crime).
79. Fullerton, 118 F.3d at 384.
80. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 491 (defining “direct-action statute” as “[a]
statute that grants an injured party direct standing to sue an insurer instead of the
insured tortfeasor”).
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assertion of privity between the civil plaintiff and the criminal
81
defendant would fail. This is because the rights of the victim to
the insurance proceeds would then not derive from the same right
82
of the insured criminal.
b.

Courts Finding No Privity

Though they are a minority, several courts refuse to find privity
between the insured criminal and the civil plaintiff seeking
83
insurance proceeds from the criminal. These courts recognize
that the right of the injured party to the insurance proceeds derives
84
from the right of the insured to those proceeds. Nevertheless, in
the interest of fairness, these courts rule that the civil plaintiff
85
should not be precluded from showing a lack of intent.
Therefore, at the time Reed was decided, a majority of courts
recognized that, in general, criminal convictions could have
86
collateral estoppel effect. In addition, a majority of courts that
had considered the issue had ruled that an insured criminal
defendant is in privity with a subsequent civil plaintiff that seeks to
87
recover from the defendant’s insurance policy.
Before Reed,
88
Minnesota had never considered the latter issue, and had not

81. See Fullerton, 118 F.3d at 384.
82. See id.
83. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 2003); Mass. Prop.
Ins. Underwriting Ass’n v. Norrington, 481 N.E.2d 1364, 1367-68 (Mass. 1985)
(“Allowing the application of [collateral estoppel] against the insured, but not
against the injured person, does no violence to the substantive principle that an
injured party succeeds only to the insured’s rights against the insurer.”); see also
Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098, 1103 (Cal. 1978) (refusing to apply
collateral estoppel to a wrongful death judgment); Aid Ins. Co. (Mut.) v. Chrest,
336 N.W.2d 437, 440-41 (Iowa 1983) (refusing to give a guilty plea in a criminal
trial collateral estoppel effect despite the Iowa law that gives guilty pleas collateral
estoppel effect against the criminal defendant); Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 267
A.2d 7, 14-15 (N.J. 1970); Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kollar, 578 A.2d
1238, 1241 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (“An innocent third-party victim . . .
should not be estopped from effectively recovering against a defendant and his
insurer when the defendant and his insurer when the defendant, for whatever
reason, elects to enter a plea of guilty.”).
84. See, e.g., Norrington, 481 N.E.2d at 1367.
85. Id. “At [the] criminal trial, [the criminal defendant] in no sense
represented the interests of [the civil plaintiff] . . . . Furthermore, [the civil
plaintiff] had no opportunity to participate in the criminal case.” Id.
86. See supra Part II.B.1. and accompanying notes.
87. See supra Part II.B.2. and accompanying notes.
88. See Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 566-68 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002).
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89

considered the former in thirty years.

III. THE REED DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
On May 25, 1999, Jordan Peschong, a one-year-old child,
90
suffered a severe, life-threatening brain injury. At the time of his
injury, Jordan was under the care of Janet Dawn Reed, who ran a
91
daycare out of her home. Reed claimed that Jordan was injured
when he fell in her kitchen while attempting to walk, and hit his
92
Reed was charged with firsthead on the hard kitchen floor.
93
94
degree assault and malicious punishment of a child. The state
95
accused Reed of causing Jordan’s injuries by shaking him, whereas
96
Reed continued to maintain that Jordan was injured in a fall.
Reed argued in the alternative that if shaking did in fact cause
Jordan’s injuries, then she was nevertheless not guilty because she
lacked intent to injure: she claimed that she shook Jordan in an
97
attempt to revive him after his fall. During Reed’s criminal trial,
the state presented testimony from seven experts showing that
Jordan’s injuries were consistent with shaken baby syndrome,
98
rather than a fall. The district court found that Reed did in fact
89. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289
(1968).
90. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 530 (Minn. 2003).
91. Id.
92. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 556.
93. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 530. The assault charge was made pursuant to MINN.
STAT. § 609.221(1) (2002). This statute provides that “[w]hoever assaults another
and inflicts great bodily harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more
than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.” Id.
94. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 530. The malicious punishment charge was made
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 609.377(6) (2002), which provides that
“[a] parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who, by an intentional act or series of
intentional acts with respect to a child, evidences unreasonable force or cruel
discipline that is excessive under the circumstances is guilty of malicious
punishment of a child . . . .” Id. § 609.377(1). If this punishment results in great
bodily harm, “the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than
ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.” Id. §
609.377(6).
95. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 530.
96. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 556.
97. Id.
98. Id. Shaken baby syndrome is brain damage caused by the shaking,
slamming, or throwing of a baby against an object. WebMD Health, Shaken Baby
Syndrome: Topic Overview, at http://my.webmd.com/hw/raising_a_family/
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shake Jordan, and that she did intend to injure him. Thus, Reed
was found guilty of both the assault and malicious punishment
100
charges at her criminal trial.
After the criminal trial, Jordan and his parents, Richard and
Kimberly Peschong, filed a negligence suit in district court against
Reed, seeking to recover for the injuries Jordan sustained at the
101
hands of Reed.
Reed turned the defense of this action over to
her insurer, Illinois Farmers Insurance Company (Illinois
102
Farmers). Illinois Farmers then initiated a declaratory judgment
action in which Reed, the Peschongs, and Jordan’s doctors were all
103
defendants.
The homeowner liability insurance policy at issue in the
declaratory judgment action contained an intentional-acts
104
exclusion clause.
This clause excluded coverage for any bodily
injury that is (a) “caused intentionally by or at the direction of an
insured,” or (b) “results from any occurrence caused by an
intentional act of any insured where the results are reasonably
105
foreseeable.”
In the policy, “occurrence” was defined as an
106
Illinois Farmers, on the
accident that results in bodily injury.
strength of this clause, argued that it had no obligation to defend
107
or indemnify Reed for Jordan’s injuries in the civil suit.
Illinois
Farmers asserted that because the question of whether or not Reed
acted intentionally was answered in the affirmative in her criminal
trial, the intentional-act exclusion applied, and the Peschongs were
collaterally estopped from showing that Jordan’s injuries were

hw169817.asp (last updated April 10, 2003). This type of violent movement causes
the baby’s brain to hit his skull, which tears blood vessels in the brain, causing
hemorrhaging and swelling. Id. Young babies (one year and under) are more
likely to be affected by the condition because of their large heads, weak necks, and
developing brains. Id. Twenty to twenty-five percent of the time, shaking causes
death; short of this, shaken babies can suffer life-long problems with seizures,
spasticity, mental retardation, blindness, learning disabilities, and physical or
emotional growth delays. Id.
99. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 556.
100. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 530. The decision was handed down by the district
court following a bench trial. Id.
101. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 556.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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108

caused by a negligent act.
Illinois Farmers then moved for summary judgment in the
declaratory action based on the intentional-act exclusion in Reed’s
109
policy. The district court denied the summary judgment motion
110
The question
and certified a question to the appellate courts.
was: “[w]hen interpreting an intentional act exclusion of a
common liability policy, does Minnesota law permit criminal
convictions to be used for collateral estoppel purposes in a
subsequent civil case in situations other that those . . . where the
criminal defendant seeks to profit from [the] crime in a
111
subsequent civil proceeding?”
B. The Minnesota Court of Appeals Decision
The court of appeals considered several issues in answering the
112
First, the court decided that the certified
certified question.
question was properly before it pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil
113
Appellate Procedure 103.03.
Secondly, the court analyzed the
114
Thompson decision, which established the precedent in Minnesota
of allowing criminal convictions to estop issues in subsequent civil
litigation where the criminal seeks to profit from the crime in the
115
civil litigation.
After noting several major changes in the law of
collateral estoppel since the time Thompson was decided, the court
of appeals decided that the estoppel effects of criminal convictions
are not limited to situations in which the criminal seeks to profit
from the crime, but rather should be determined on the same basis
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Minn. 2003).
111. Id. The district court found that all other requirements of collateral
estoppel were met. Id. Therefore, the district court believed that if the certified
question were answered in the affirmative, then Illinois Farmers would be entitled
to summary judgment. Id.
112. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 557-65.
113. Id. at 557. The court may hear an interlocutory appeal from a denial of
summary judgment only if the question certified by the district court is “important
and doubtful.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(i) (2001). A question is “important”
if it “will have a statewide impact,” “it is likely to be reversed,” “it will terminate
lengthy proceedings,” and “the harm inflicted on the parties by a wrong ruling . . .
is substantial.” Jostens, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 612 N.W.2d 878, 884
(Minn. 2000). A question is “doubtful” if there is no controlling precedent and
there is ground for a difference of opinion. Id. at 884-85.
114. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 558-59. The certified question from the district court
made specific reference to Thompson. Id. at 557.
115. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289 (1968).
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116

as any other type of judgment.
Thus, the court answered the
117
certified question in the affirmative.
However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals did not end its
118
analysis with answering the certified question.
After deciding
that criminal convictions have the same collateral estoppel effect as
any other judgment, the court went on to apply the normal
collateral estoppel analysis to determine whether or not the
Peschongs were precluded from re-litigating the issue of Reed’s
119
intent. This analysis required that four criteria be met before the
judgment was given collateral estoppel effect: (1) the issue to be
estopped must have been identical to one in a prior judgment; (2)
there must have been a final judgment on the merits; (3) the
estopped party must have been a party to, or in privity with a party
to, the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party must have
been given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the
120
adjudicated issue.
After considering these requirements, the
court of appeals ruled that each was met, and the Peschongs were
121
precluded from re-litigating the issue of Reed’s intent.
Having
decided both that criminal convictions should be given collateral
estoppel effect, and that all of the elements of collateral estoppel
were met, the court of appeals reversed the denial of Illinois
116. Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 560-65.
117. Id. at 565.
118. Id. The court noted that “[t]he general policies that might otherwise
persuade us to limit our review to the certified question (to avoid piece-meal
litigation, to conserve judicial resources, and to expedite trial proceedings) would
not be served by remanding the matter to the district court . . . .” Id.
119. Id. at 565-68.
120. Id. at 566 (quoting Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc, 452 N.W.2d 648, 650
(Minn. 1990)).
121. Id. at 565-68. The court of appeals first noted that the criminal conviction
was, without doubt, a final judgment for collateral estoppel purposes. Id. at 566.
The Peschongs challenged the other three elements. Id. First, the Peschongs
argued that the issue to be estopped was not the identical issue litigated in the
criminal trial, because in the criminal trial the state proved that Reed intentionally
shook Jordan, not that Reed intentionally caused Jordan’s injuries. Id. Both the
district court and the court of appeals found this argument unconvincing. Id. at
566-67. The Peschongs also argued that they were neither a party to, nor in privity
with a party to, the criminal trial, and as such could not be estopped by it. Id. at
567. The court of appeals ruled that because the Peschongs’ right to the
insurance proceeds derived from Reed’s right to them, the Peschongs were in
privity with Reed. Id. Finally, the Peschongs argued that they had not had a full
and fair opportunity to be heard, and therefore could not be estopped. Id. Again,
the court of appeals focused on Reed instead: because Reed had an opportunity to
be heard, and the Peschongs were in privity with Reed, the Peschongs were
estopped from re-litigating intent. Id. at 568.
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Farmers’ summary judgment motion and remanded for entry of
122
judgment in favor of Illinois Farmers.
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court and held that Reed’s criminal conviction did not
collaterally estop the Peschongs from attempting to show that her
123
act was negligent, rather than intentional.
In reaching this
conclusion, the Reed court began its analysis where the court of
appeals ended: by considering whether the four elements necessary
124
for a judgment to be given collateral estoppel effect were met. In
this analysis, the court used persuasive Massachusetts precedent:
125
Massachusetts Property Insurance Underwriting Ass’n v. Norrington.
In its decision, the court emphasized the fact that the
Peschongs had not been given a “full and fair opportunity to be
126
heard.”
Thus, the supreme court’s reversal was based on the
finding that two of the requirements for collateral estoppel were
not met: the party to be estopped by the prior judgment (the
Peschong family) was not given a full and fair opportunity to be
127
heard, and therefore, by implication, the Peschong family was
128
neither a party to the criminal trial nor in privity with a party to
129
The Reed court did recognize that “the right of the
that trial.
injured party to have recourse to the indemnity promised by the
130
insurer rises no higher than the right of the insured.” Thus, the
Peschongs’ right to proceeds of the Illinois Farmers policy derived
131
from Reed’s right to those proceeds. Nevertheless, the Reed court
122. Id. at 568.
123. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 534 (Minn. 2003). The
court also noted that certified questions are subject to de novo review. Id. at 531.
124. Id. at 531-32.
125. 481 N.E.2d 1364 (Mass. 1985).
126. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 534 (quoting Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil
Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn. 1982)).
127. The “party or privity” requirement and the “full and fair opportunity to
be heard” requirement are closely analogous, and are likely to succeed or fail en
masse. Indeed, the Massachusetts court in Norrington combined the two into one
element, and enumerated only three elements. See Mass. Prop. Ins. Underwriting
Ass’n v. Norrington, 481 N.E.2d 1364, 1366 (Mass. 1985).
128. See Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 533. The parties to the criminal trial were the
State of Minnesota and Reed. Id.
129. See id.
130. Id. (quoting Norrington, 481 N.E.2d at 1367).
131. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion as to this
point. See Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 567 (Minn. Ct. App.
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held that this did not constitute privity between the Peschongs and
132
It was on this basis that the Reed court reversed the court
Reed.
of appeals and remanded the matter to the district court for
133
further proceedings.
The supreme court did not, however, answer the certified
question: whether a criminal conviction can generally be used for
134
collateral estoppel purposes.
Thus, there are two important
135
factors to the Reed decision: the analysis of what constitutes privity
and the failure to address the court of appeals’ holding that
136
criminal trials may be used for collateral estoppel purposes.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE REED DECISION
The Reed decision is important to the development of
Minnesota collateral estoppel law both in its correct interpretation
of how privity should be defined as well as its lack of clarity on the
issue of the general collateral estoppel effect of a criminal
conviction.
A. The Privity Issue
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly ruled on the privity
issue in Reed, finding that the Peschongs were not in privity with
Janet Reed, despite the fact that the Peschongs’ right to the
137
insurance proceeds derived from Reed’s right to those proceeds.
This result appears to place Minnesota among the minority of
138
courts that have considered the issue.
The Reed court followed
2002).
132. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 533. It is this conclusion that constitutes the chief
disagreement between the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion and that of the
Minnesota Court of Appeals. See Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 567-68.
133. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 533-34.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 533-34.
136. Id. See Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 561 (stating that it is now commonly accepted
in many jurisdictions that dispositions of criminal cases may be used for collateral
estoppel purposes in subsequent civil litigation).
137. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 530.
138. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374, 386 (5th Cir. 1997)
(stating that decisions finding no privity in situations like those in Reed are both
less numerous and less recent than those finding privity). Fullerton went one step
further in the liberal application of collateral estoppel: it found that a guilty plea in
a criminal case could be given preclusive effect because it was sufficient to meet
the “actually litigated” requirement of collateral estoppel. Id. This approach may
be gaining adherents. See id. at 378-81. Nonetheless, this approach calls into
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persuasive Massachusetts precedent in deciding the privity issue.
The Massachusetts court, in dealing with facts similar to those in
Reed, correctly focused on the fact that the party to be estopped had
140
no opportunity to participate in the criminal case. In addition to
the Massachusetts case, persuasive precedent provided by the
141
Restatement also informed the Reed decision on the privity issue.
1.

Policy Concerns Supporting the Reed Decision

“The term ‘privity’ is one of those conclusory words that
142
Therefore,
provides little insight into the underlying policies.”
an analysis of whether privity exists in cases such as Reed requires
more than a simple survey of persuasive precedent; it is necessary to
consider the underlying policy ramifications as well. Of primary
importance are due process concerns. Though Reed, at her
criminal trial, and the Peschongs, at their civil trial, were both
interested in showing a lack of intent by Reed, “it create[ed] no
privity between two parties that, as litigants in two different suits,
they happen[ed] to be interested in proving or disproving the same
143
facts.”
Thus, unless the Peschongs’ interests were actually
litigated at the criminal trial, to deny them the right to litigate
144
Reed’s intent at the civil trial would be a violation of due process.
question both the “actually litigated” requirement of collateral estoppel as well as
the “party or in privity” requirement.
139. Mass. Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n v. Norrington, 481 N.E.2d 1364
(Mass. 1985) (finding no privity between a convicted murderer and the next of kin
of the murder victim).
140. Id. at 1366-68.
141. Id. at 1367.
D inflicts a blow on X as a result of which X dies. D is convicted of
intentional homicide. P, administrator of X’s estate, brings an action
against D for wrongful death, alleging D’s act was negligent. I had
previously issued a policy of liability insurance to D, insuring liability for
D’s negligent acts but excluding intentional acts. In P’s action against D,
P is not precluded by the criminal conviction from showing that D’s act was
negligent rather than intentional.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 cmt. F, illus. 10 (1982) (emphasis
added). The Restatement also defines privity in several other ways: as it relates to
wrongful death statutes; between family members with separate causes of action
derived from one injury; and between members of a partnership based on a single
injury. Id. §§ 46, 48, 60. None of these examples of privity apply to the instant
situation.
142. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 1174.
143. Norrington, 481 N.E.2d at 1367 (quoting Sturbridge v. Franklin, 35 N.E.
669 (Mass. 1893)).
144. “It is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant
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Another policy concern worthy of note is the fact that no
undue burden will be placed on the insurer by not allowing it to
use collateral estoppel because it has not previously had to litigate
145
the issue of the insured’s intent.
Therefore, Illinois Farmers is
not prejudiced in any way by having to litigate Reed’s intent at the
civil trial.
Finally, several fairness issues would be raised by not allowing
the Peschongs to litigate the issue of Reed’s intent. For example,
though both Janet Reed and the Peschongs were interested in
showing Reed’s lack of intent, it is quite possible that Reed would
have expended more effort attempting to prove that she did not
shake Jordan to begin with than in attempting to prove that she did
146
so unintentionally. Thus, it is possible that Reed’s intent was not
litigated fully. Another fairness concern is the possibility that Reed
may have been represented by less able counsel than the
147
Peschongs. If this were the case, it would be unfair to saddle the
Peschongs with the results of Reed’s less-than-adequate counsel. In
addition, the Peschongs did not have the opportunity either to
cross-examine Reed or to present their own evidence and
148
experts.
Finally, the Fifth Amendment right of a criminal
defendant to not testify, as contrasted against the negative
inference that can be drawn from the refusal of a defendant to
149
testify in a civil case, may have a large effect on the result. These
issues all dictate the conclusion that the Reed court was correct in its
definition of privity.

who . . . has never had an opportunity to be heard.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
145. See Norrington, 481 N.E.2d at 1368. The state had to litigate the issue of
intent at the criminal trial; the insurance company did not. Id.
146. An illustration from the field of tort law may be helpful in clarifying this
point. The elements of battery are (a) acting with the intent to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with another, and (b) a harmful or offensive contact occurs.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965). Both elements are necessary in
order for there to have been a battery. Id. Therefore, both elements would be
said to have been “fully litigated” at a criminal trial. However, it is probable that
the defendant would focus more energy on disproving one element or the other.
Therefore, it seems unfair to hold a third party to the result of the prior litigation
when perhaps a more vigorous litigation of the intent issue would have yielded a
contrary result.
147. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 552, 163 N.W.2d 289,
292 (1968).
148. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 533 (Minn. 2003).
149. Id.
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Policy Concerns Arguing Against the Reed Decision
150

Weighed against the factors enumerated above are policies
151
concerned with reducing the needless expenditure of resources.
While it is true that more of the judicial system’s resources will be
expended by not applying collateral estoppel in cases like Reed, the
due process considerations must take precedent over judicial
economy concerns.
Another policy issue that argues against the Reed decision is the
possibility that if the Peschongs are successful in proving that Reed
acted negligently, that result would be inconsistent with the
152
criminal trial and would reflect poorly on the judicial system.
This concern should not be overstated, however. As noted above, it
is quite possible that Reed did not focus on proving her lack of
intent during her criminal trial, but rather on proving that she did
153
not shake Jordan.
Therefore, a negligence finding in the civil
trial would not be altogether inconsistent with the result of the
criminal trial.
Because there are only a few minor policy concerns arguing
against its decision, the Reed court was correct in protecting the
Peschongs’ right to due process by finding that they were not in
privity with Reed.
B. The General Collateral Estoppel Effect of Criminal Convictions
The second important aspect of Reed, and the one which the
court failed to discuss, is its treatment of the general issue of
whether a criminal conviction can operate as an estoppel to
subsequent civil litigation. In reversing the court of appeals based
on the lack of privity, the Minnesota Supreme Court left the
154
collateral estoppel effect of a criminal conviction murky.
150. See supra Part IV.A.1.
151. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). “Collateral
estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of
protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same
party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless
litigation.” Id.
152. See Travelers Ins. Co., 281 Minn. at 555, 163 N.W.2d at 294 (“[T]o permit a
retrial of the facts and issues already determined in the criminal proceeding would
be an imposition on the courts and only tend to embarrass or bring into disrepute
the judicial process.”).
153. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
154. See generally supra text accompanying notes 33-76 (discussing the
traditional approach to, and historical development of, the collateral estoppel
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Without a clear directive on this issue, practitioners are left in the
dark as to whether a criminal conviction will be given full collateral
estoppel effect (where the other requirements of collateral
estoppel are met) or whether the effect is limited to the “profit155
from-the-crime” exception.
Thus, the Reed court should have
taken a position on this issue, even though it was not necessary to
the decision. To do so would not have been inappropriate, as the
certified question from the district court asked exactly this
156
question.
Had the Minnesota Supreme Court made a ruling on the
general collateral estoppel effect of a criminal conviction, that
ruling would not have been necessary to the result, and would
157
therefore have been dictum. However, it is important to note the
158
The
difference between “obiter dictum” and “judicial dictum.”
latter is “an expression of opinion on a question directly involved
and argued by counsel though not entirely necessary to the
159
decision.” Such an expression is “entitled to much greater weight
160
than mere obiter dictum and should not be lightly disregarded.”
The question of whether criminal convictions can be used for
collateral estoppel purposes was certainly argued by counsel, and
161
the court of appeals considered this question very carefully.
Therefore, if the Reed court had expressed an opinion on the issue,
that opinion would have been judicial dictum, and collateral
162
estoppel law in Minnesota would be clearer than it is now.
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not make an expression of
its opinion on the matter, however, so we are left with the court of
effect of criminal judgments in civil cases).
155. See Travelers Ins. Co., 281 Minn. at 552, 163 N.W.2d at 292 (recognizing the
“profit-from-the-crime” exception as one instance in which a criminal conviction is
given collateral estoppel effect).
156. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Minn. 2003).
157. More properly called “obiter dictum,” dictum is defined as “[a] judicial
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to
the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be
considered persuasive).” BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 1102.
158. See 43 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Stare Decisis § 1.03 (4th ed. 1999).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 560-64 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002).
162. See 43 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Stare Decisis § 1.03 (4th ed. 1999); see also
State v. Rainer, 258 Minn. 168, 177, 103 N.W.2d 389, 396 (1960) (stating that
judicial dictum is the “expression of the court . . . and as such is entitled to much
greater weight than mere obiter dictum and should not be lightly disregarded”).
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appeals’ opinion. For this reason, it is important to consider the
value of this opinion after being reversed by the supreme court.
Though its reversal certainly relegates the court of appeals’ opinion
to the status of dubious precedent, it probably does retain some
163
degree of precedential value. Indeed, because the supreme court
reversed the court of appeals on the privity issue rather than on the
issue of the general collateral estoppel effect of criminal
convictions, the appellate opinion on this point may be the law in
Minnesota. Of course, this will not be certain until a Minnesota
court again rules on the issue.
V. CONCLUSION
In Reed, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that there is no
privity between an insured criminal and a litigant who sues the
164
criminal in a civil suit.
This decision allows the civil plaintiff to
re-litigate the criminal’s intent, or lack of intent, and thereby seek
to collect from the criminal’s liability insurer despite an intentional
165
act exemption clause.
Though this places Minnesota among the
166
minority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue, it is the
correct decision. The Reed court correctly places the right to due
process above judicial economy concerns.
The court is not as successful, however, in its treatment of the
question of whether a criminal conviction will generally be given
collateral estoppel effect. In short, the court gives this issue no
treatment at all, despite the fact that it was discussed at length in
the court of appeals opinion that the court reversed. Though
167
taking a stance on this issue would have been dicta, it nonetheless
would have been dicta that cleared up what is currently a murky
area in Minnesota procedural law.
163. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 7429R, 2002 WL
1077735, at *6 (Minn. Tax Ct. May 15, 2002) (citing United States v. L.A. Tucker
Truck Lanes, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952) for the proposition that “an issue neither
raised in briefs or argument nor discussed in the opinion is not binding precedent
on that legal point”). Because the supreme court did not discuss the general issue
of whether collateral estoppel effect should be given to criminal convictions, it can
at least be said that its opinion is not binding on that point, and therefore did not
reverse that portion of the court of appeals’ decision.
164. Reed, 662 N.W.2d at 531.
165. Id.
166. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374, 386 (5th Cir.
1997) (stating that decisions finding no privity in situations like those in Reed are
both less numerous and less recent than those finding privity).
167. See Reed, 662 N.W.2d 529.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has inaugurated a successful
rule of law for a very specific class of cases: those in which a
convicted criminal with an insurance policy containing an
intentional-acts exclusion clause is subsequently sued for harm
168
resulting from his or her crime. However, the court has failed to
rule on the broader issue of whether a criminal conviction can
169
generally serve to collaterally estop subsequent civil litigation.
Thus, in Reed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has lost sight of the
forest for the trees.

168.
169.

See id.
See id.
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